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INTRODUCTION 
What impact does direct taxation - in other words income tax and 
social security contributions, in this context - have on the poor in 
Ireland? We know that income tax rates are relatively high here, and 
that the PAYE sector bears a very large part of the direct tax burden. 
This has lead to repeated calls for tax reform and/or tax reductions in 
recent years, with the two not always being distinguished. What we 
do not known is what effect, if any, direct tax currently has on those at 
low income levels, and how these groups might therefore be affected 
by the various proposals which have been made for tax re-
ductions I reforms. 
In this paper, we examine the importance of income tax and PRSI 
contrjbutions for the poor, on the basis of the data gathered in the 
Economic and Social Research lnstitute's large-scale Survey of 
Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services. This 
survey, carried out in 1987, has formed the basis for detailed studies 
of poverty and the effectiveness of the social welfare system, in 
particular the report for the Combat Poverty Agency (Callan et al 
1988) and a forthcoming ESRI publication (Callan et al 1989). Having 
assessed the role which income taxi PRSI contributions actually play 
for those on low incomes, we explore how the structure of the tax and 
PRSI systems leads to some people at these income levels paying tax 
and I or contributions Finally, we look at the number of possible 
approaches to the reform of these systems in terms of their impact on 
the "low-income taxpayer". 
What this paper is concerned with, then, is the operation of income 
tax and PAS/ only as they directly affect those on low incomes as 
taxpayers. It does not deal with the other side of the coin, the way 
transfers to the poor are funded by income tax and the PRSI systems. 
Elsewhere (Callan and Nolan 1989, Callan et al 1989) we have 
analysed the operation of the social welfare system, and its crucial 
role in alleviating poverty. For the purpose of the present exercise, we 
ignore how the funds raised by income tax and PRSI contributions 
are spent. our focus is purely on how they are raised and the way this 
impinges on those on low incomes. 
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2 Taxation and the Poor 
2.1 Do the Poor Pay Income Tax/ PRSI? 
In looking at the impact of the income tax and social security 
contributions systems on the poor, the first question is to what extent 
do the poor actually enter the tax net? We can answer this on the 
basis of the data gathered in the ESRl's Survey of Income Distribution, 
Poverty and Usage of State Services, carried out in 1987. This 
gathered information on about 3,300 households, 12,000 persons, 
including detailed data on incomes from various sources and on 
direct tax paid. The survey and its content are described at length in 
our ESRI publication (Callan et al., 1989), so we will say little more 
about the database here. It may be sufficient to note that the sample 
was drawn on a random basis from the Electoral Register, and was 
designed to provide a representative picture of the income distribu-
tion as a whole, not just the poor. Thus, those on low incomes can be 
seen in the context of the overall distribution, and their living 
standards - and in the current context the tax they pay- compared 
with those in the middle and upper parts of the distribution. 
Before we can focus on "the poor", the term must be defined. In our 
report for the Combat Poverty Agency last year (Callan et al 1988) and 
in our recent ESRI study, we go to some lengths to explore what is 
meant by 'poverty' in an advanced society. Poverty in such a context 
may most usefully be seen in terms of exclusion from ordinary living 
patterns due to lack of resources. While this broad definition would 
probably meet with general acceptance, no unique and objective 
approach to measuring poverty defined in this way has been 
produced. 
We have therefore made use of, inter alia, a range of relative poverty 
lines. These are calculated as 40 per cent, 50 per cent and 60per cent 
of average disposable household income in our sample, taking into 
account the differing needs of households of different size and 
composition. The first step is, therefore, to convert household 
incomes to a comparable basis by applying equivalence scales, 
designed to adjust for these differences in needs. The scales we 
employ in the present paper, taking a single adult as 1, allow 0.66 for 
the needs of an extra adult and 0.33 for those of a child. Thus, a couple 
with two children and an income of £200 per week are considered to 
be "equivalent" to a single adult with about [200/(1 +0.66 +0.33 
+0.33] = £86 per week. These scales are similar to those incorporated 
in the payment levels for dependants of some of the main social 
welfare schemes. (The use of equivalence scales in this manner is 
discussed in detail in Callan et al., 1989, which also employs a range 
of values in analysing the extent and composition of poverty.) 
Given the uncertainty about where precisely to locate a meaningful 
poverty line, here we follow the procedure we have adopted 
elsewhere, of presenting results for all three relative thresholds. This 
allows the sensitivity of the results to the exact line chosen to be 
assessed, and is in our view considerably more useful than concen-
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trating on one. to a greater or lesser extent arbitrary, cut-ott between 
"the poor" and the rest of the income distribution. The percentage of 
households in the 1987 sample falling below each of these three 
thresholds is as follows: 
40% threshold: 7.5% 
50% threshold : 17.4% 
60% threshold : 29.9% 
It is worth noting the actual income levels which these thresholds 
represent. For a single adult. the 40%, 50% and 60% lines are about 
£34, £43 and £51 per week. respectively (and apply to 1987). 
It is important to note that while income. as measured in our survey, is 
expressed as a current weekly amount, for certain sources - self-
employment (including farm) and investment income - this re-
presents the weekly equivalent of the total received over a longer 
period, usually a year. This practice, which is common to other similar 
surveys such as the CSO's Household Budget Surveys, is adopted in 
order to even out those particularly variable receipts. Similarly, the tax 
paid on income from these sources represents the weekly average of 
the amount paid during the past twelve months. 
Returning, then, to the question with which we began, do "the poor" 
pay direct tax? Of the households below, each of these cut-otts. only 
a small proportion do so, i.e., 
11 % of those below the 40% line, 
121/2% of those below the 50% line 
and 18% of those below the 60% line. 
Thus, at the 40% and 50% lines, only about one in eight of the 
households below these thresholds are paying income tax and/or 
PRSI contributions. At the highest of the cut-offs, the 60% line, while 
the figure is considerably higher, it is still less than one-fifth of the 
households below the line. 
2.2 Which Low-Income Households Pay Income Tax/PRSI? 
Having established that only a small minority of poor households 
currently pay income tax or PRSI contributions, the next step is to 
look at the characteristics of those who do so. We focus first on the 
nature of the household head's participation in the labour force. 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of all households falling below the 
three relative income thresholds and of the subset of those who are 
paying income tax/ PRSI, by the labour force status of their head. The 
composition of those below the thresholds is discussed in some 
detail in Callan et a/(1988, 1989) noting in particular the importance of 
households headed by farmers and unemployed. Although almost 
40% of the households in the sample are headed by an employee. 
households of this type make up onlv about 10% of those below the 
40% and 50% lines. Even at the 60% line they only comprise 13.5% of 
those below the threshold. 
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Looking at the subset of households below the tlslresholds who are 
paying income tax/PRSI, though, the pattern is very different. 
Between 57% and 62% of all these households are headed by an 
employee. The other substantial groups are those headed by a 
farmer. other self-employed, unemployed or sick/disabled - very 
few low-income households headed by someone retired or in home 
duties paid tax. 
TABLE 1: 
Composillon of All Household• Below Relative Poverty Lines, and Those Below Paying Income Tax/PRSI, by 
Labour Force Status ot Head 
Relative Poverty Una 
40% 50% 60% 
%of those % 01 ttiose %ofihose 
Labour Force %of all below %of all below and %of all below and 
status o! nead below line and paying tax below line paying tax below line paying tax 
Employee 9.8 59.3 9.4 56.7 13.5 62.2 
Farmer 37.3 18.1 23.9 17.3 17.6 11.1 
Self-employed 6.9 78 5.0 8.2 4.8 6.0 
Unemployed 17.2 6.4 34.9 8.8 25.6 10.5 
Sick/Disabled 8.8 8.8 10.4 9.3 12.6 5.2 
Retired 9.5 9.2 1.1 10.2 0.8 
Home Duties 10.3 7.0 0.8 15.4 2.1 
TABLE 2 
Composition of Households Below Relative Poverty Lines, and of Those Below and Paying Income Tax/ PRSI 
Relative Poverty Line 
40% 50% 60% 
% of those % ol those % ottMse 
'.I/:, cl all below 't of all below and '*i of all below and 
below line and paying tax below line paying tax below ime paying tax 
% with at !east 
one chrld 48 57 58 71 52 75 
1rJ with three or 
more children 22 24 28 32 24 40 
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So households headed by an employee form onll( a small element of 
those below the thresholds but a majority of those below and paying 
tax, reflecting the fact that most households of that type, even at low 
income levels, are paying income tax/ PRSI. At the· 60% threshold, for 
example, over 80% of the employee-headed households below this 
line are paying tax/PRSI. By contrast, only about 20% of the 
households headed by a self-employed person and falling below this 
line are paying tax/PRSI. The distinction between employees on the 
one hand and farmers and other self-employed on the other has such 
a major impact in determining whether tax/PRSI is paid not only 
because of the substantial differences in the way the income tax code 
treats them, but also because of the structure of PRSI at the time of the 
survey (though this is currently being restructured) as explored in 
detail in Section 3 below. 
Another important characteristic of low-income households paying 
tax, namely their size and composition, should also be noted. These 
households are in fact more likely than other low-income households 
to contain children, and also more likely to contain three or more 
children. Table 2 shows the comparison between all those falling 
below the threshold and the subset of those paying tax in terms of the 
presence/absence, and number, of children. The contrast is parti-
cularly marked at the 60% cut-off: here three-quarters of the low-
income households paying tax contain a child, and 40% have three or 
more children, compared with only 52% and 24%, respectively for all 
households below the threshold. Since the relative poverty lines are 
based on needs-adjusted equivalent income, a household with an 
income sufficient to bring it into the tax net but with a number of 
children, may be "pushed" below the threshold(s) when the needs of 
these children are taken into account. Family size can thus be an 
important factor contributing to the overlap between poverty and 
income tax, as we explore below. This is also to be seen in the context 
of the overall finding which we have emphasised in previous papers 
that large families face a particularly high risk of being in poverty, and 
one which has been increasing over time. It may also be emphasised 
that this is not simply a product of the particular equivalence scales 
used, but holds across a variety of scales. 
Another factor which may contribute to low-income households 
paying tax is the number of people in the household at work. The tax 
system operates at the level of the nuclear family of husband, wife and 
dependent children, rather than the broader household, which may 
include working children or may, for example, consist of two brothers 
or sisters. There is more than one tax unit in a significant number of 
households, and each will be assessed independently for tax. The 
situation may then arise that even though the household's total 
income is relatively low, a working son, for example, may be paying a 
substantial amount in income tax. Low-income households paying 
income tax/PRSI are in fact more likely than other low-income 
households to have more than one member in work. At the 50% 
threshold, for example, 31 % of those below and paying tax had more 
than one person at work, compared with 15% for all those below. 
While in some of these it was the husband and wife who were at work, 
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in which case their income would (almost always) be aggregated in 
determining tax liability, in many instances the second person at work 
was another household member. 
Considering these various characteristics together then, the main 
groups into which low-income taxpayers fall are as follows 
households headed by an employee and containing children; 
this is by far the most substantial group, accounting for almost 
half of all low income households paying tax and below the 50% 
line; many of these have three or more children, and most have 
only one person at work; 
farm households; the majority of these do not contain children, 
and not very many have three or more children; 
households headed by an unemployed or sick person but with 
some other household member at work; the majority of these 
contain children, but not three or more; 
making up a considerably smaller group than these are house-
holds headed by a self-employed (non-farm) person; about two-
thirds of these contain children, one-third have three or more. 
2.3 The Impact of Income Tax/PRSI Contributions on the Poor 
We have looked at the number and characteristics of low-income 
taxpaying households. Before detailing the way in which the stucture 
of the tax and PRSI systems operate to produce low-income 
households paying tax, it is important to see how important these 
deductions actually are for the households involved, and their overall 
contribution to the problem of poverty. 
The amount of tax being paid by these households is analysed in 
Table 3. This shows the breakdown of the taxpaying households 
below each threshold by range of income tax plus PRSI contributions 
being paid. This shows that for most, the amounts involved are 
substantial. At the 50% line, for example, only 22% are paying less 
than 1 O a week, and 57% are paying20 or more. So, although only a 
small proportion of those below the thresholds are paying income 
tax/PRSI, for most of these it is significant rather than marginal. 
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Table 3 
Households Below Relative Poverty Line Paying Income Tax/PRSI, 
by Amount Paid 
Amount of Households Paying Income Tax/PRSI and Below 
Income Tax +PRSI 
£ per week 40% line 50% 60% 
<5 12.9 9.6 11.4 
>5 < 10 5.1 12.7 11.1 
>10 < 15 10.1 12.5 9.0 
> 15 < 20 6.8 8.3 9.7 
> 20 < 30 19.7 20.8 19.8 
> 30 <40 12.8 15.8 16.8 
> 50 < 50 2.7 5.0 8.00 
> 50 29.9 15.2 14.2 
100 100 100 
In addition to the absolute amounts of tax/PRSI being paid by 
households below the poverty line(s), it is also interesting to compare 
the tax paid by each household with the shortfall or "poverty gap" of 
that household. That is, we calculate the extent to which the 
household falls below a particular poverty line, simply subtracting its 
disposable income from that line to derive what is termed its "poverty 
gap". Comparing income tax paid with that gap, we then see the 
contribution which the tax deduction makes to the household's 
shortfall below the line. If tax paid is equal to orgreater than the 
poverty gap, the household in question would not be below the 
poverty line a tall in the absence of the tax deduction. Even where tax 
paid is less than the poverty gap, we can see that in the absence of the 
tax the gap would only be, for example, half what it actually is. 
In fact, income tax plus PRSI contribution paid is equal to or greater 
than the poverty gap for two thirds of all those households below the 
40 per cent line who paid tax. For both the 50 per cent and 60 pr cent 
lines the corresponding figure is 56 per cent. So if income tax and 
PRSI had not been deducted, these households would not have been 
below the poverty line(s) at all. For the remainder of "poor taxpayers", 
the amount paid in income tax/PRSI is equal to between 25 per cent 
and 35 per cent of their poverty gap on average, depending on the 
threshold. 
So income tax/PRSI, although relevant for only a minority of the poor, 
is indeed significant for that minority. The relative importance of 
income tax versus PRSI also merits examination. For households 
headed by an employee, PRSI is significant, but it is not the case that it 
dominates the amount paid. Although we do not have full information 
in all cases for our sample, it appears that, on average, about 25-30% 
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of the amount paid by these households is PRSI contributions, the 
remainder is income tax. So the particular structure of the PRSI 
system - which has no income exemption limits or allowances. as 
outlined in the next section - is not the only factor at work for these 
households. For households headed by a self-employed person or a 
farmer. PRSI is not a substantial part of the total paid in most cases. 
(This might be expected to change with the extension of the coverage 
of these groups under the PRSI scheme currently being implement-
ed, as also discussed below.) 
We now turn to an examination of the structure of the income tax and 
PRSI systems. to see how the phenomenon of low-income house-
holds paying tax and/or contributions comes about. before discuss-
ing some possible reforms. 
TABLE 4 
Comparison of Relative Poverty Lines and Income Tax Exemption Limits, 
1987 
£ per week 
Exemption Relative Poverty Line 
Household Type Limit 40% 50% 60% 
Age under 65: 
Single adult 50.82 34.20 42.75 51.30 
Married couple 101.64 56.77 70.96 85.16 
Couple with 1 child 101.64 68.06 85.07 102.09 
Couple with 2 children 101.64 79.34 99.18 119.02 
Couple with 3 children 101.64 90.63 113.29 135.94 
Couple with 4 children 101.64 101.92 127.40 152.87 
Couple with 5 children 101.64 113.20 141.50 169.80 
Aged 65· 74: 
Single adult 60.41 34.20 42.75 5130 
Married couple 120.82 56.77 70.96 85.16 
Aged 75 or over: 
Single adult 70.48 34.20 42.75 51.30 
Married couple 140.96 56.77 70.96 85.16 
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3 The Structure of Income Tax/PRSI and the Poor 
3.1 Income Tax 
We begin by looking at the relevant aspects of the income tax system. 
How do some households with relatively low incomes come to be 
paying income tax? The most important feature of the system in this 
context is the exemption limits, the income levels below which 
complete exemption from income tax is granted. Our survey was 
carried out during the tax years 1986/87 and 1987 /88, and for both 
these years the exemption limits were as follows: 
Single person aged under 65 
Single person aged between 65 and 74 
Single person aged 75 and over 
Married couple aged under 65 
Married couple aged between 65 and 74 








These limits give a married couple twice the threshold of a single 
person, and take no account of children. (Child additions to the limits 
have in fact been introduced in the 1989 Budget. as we discuss 
below, but first we are interested in the situation as it held when our 
data were collected.) 
These limits, converted to a weekly equivalent, are compared in Table 
4 with the level of the relative poverty lines for various household 
types employed in our analysis. Since the exemption limit was the 
same for couples with children as without, but the poverty line rises as 
the number of children increases, family size is critical to whether the 
poverty lines are above or below the limit. The 400/o line is below the 
exemption limit for a single person or a couple (aged under 65) with 
up to three children. For a couple with four children, though, even this 
lowest relative line is marginally above the exemption level. With the 
500/o line, a couple with three children will have a poverty line above 
the exemption limit. With the 600/o line, even a couple with one child 
have a poverty line just above the exemption limit. So it is easy to see 
why families with children are found to make up such an important 
element of those below the poverty lines and paying tax. 
Even for a single adult under 65, the 60% poverty line is just above the 
exemption limit. Since the exemption limits increase for the elderly 
while the poverty lines do not, all the poverty lines are, however, well 
below the limits for single elderly or elderly couples. 
Where income is only just above the exemption limits. marginal relief 
is applied so that tax liability does not rise very rapidly from zero as 
income moves over the limit. Even so. tax liability can be substantial 
for some of those below the poverty lines, particularly families with 
children. For example, a family with four children and an income of 
£125 a week, £6,500 per year, would fall below the 50% line. However, 
they would be well above the tax exemption limit of £5,300, and their 
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tax liability (assuming there was one employee with married, employee 
' and PRSI allowances) would come to £530 per annum, £10 a week. 
Or a three-child family on £135 per week, under the 60% line, could 
have tax liability of £14 per week. 
One major factor explaining the fact that some of those below the 
relative poverty lines pay income tax is therefore the level at which the 
exemption limits are set, and particularly the fact that in 1987 these 
made no allowance for children. In the 1989 Budget, a £200 addition 
to the exemption level per child was introduced. This, it was stated, 
was intended to target relief at a group particularly in need of support, 
namely low-income families. "It will go a long way towards alleviating 
the tax burden on low income families and towards restoring the 
reward for work among parents of such families," the Minister for 
Finance explained (Budget Booklet, 1989, p.19). The general 
exemption limits were also increased this year by more than they had 
been in 1988, and now stand at £~.OOO for a single person and £6,000 
for a married couple. About 24,000 taxpayers with 46,000 children 
would be removed from the tax net by the 1989 measures, according 
to the Budget. 
This new child addition to the exemption limits does indeed alter the 
relationship between these limits and the poverty lines shown in 
Table 6. The £200 addition in itself adds almost £4 per week per child 
to the exemption limits. While a significant number of families are 
therefore exempt, the relative poverty lines for large families would in 
many instances remain above the exemption limits. This is because 
these lines allow considerably more for the "needs" of a child relative 
to an adult or a couple without children than the new child additions 
to the exemption limits. The poverty lines reflect the relativities in 
major social welfare payments, where a child dependant may receive 
perhaps 30% of the single adult rate. The tax exemption limit child 
additions, though, represent only 6. 7% of the single adult limit. In 
terms of equalising the position of families with children and those 
without, then, the new additions may represent only a first step. 
Returning to the factors which may produce low-income taxpayers, 
so far we have dealt with the general structure of the system in terms 
of exemption levels, which applies to all. However, as we have seen, 
the differential treatment of employees versus the self-employed is 
also important. Employees in almost all cases pay through PAYE, 
their tax payments are based on income in the current year. For the 
self-employed, on the other hand, tax is charged in arrears: liability in 
the current tax year should relate to income in the previous year. This 
can obviously lead to a situation where those with low current 
incomes are paying tax on the basis of higher income last year. 
For the self-employed in our survey, the income tax data gathered 
refers to payments in the past twelve months. The income data relate 
to the most recent twelve months for which the respondent had 
information. This frequently is also the past year, but in other cases 
may be the last tax year or even the one before that. For farmers, while 
the tax paid refers to the past twelve months, incomes were estimated 
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on the basis of the calendar year 1986. It is, theref9re, difficult'to draw 
general conclusions about the relationship between tax paid and 
income, and the importance of payment in arrears. It is clearly one 
possible factor explaining how low-income self-employed are none 
the less paying income tax. This may be particularly relevant to 
farmers, for whom 1986 was a particularly bad year. Tax paid in the 
year up to interview, sometime in 1987, may have accrued in an 
earlier year or indeed over a number of years. 
A third factor, already adverted to, is the fact that our analysis has 
been on the basis of household income, whereas tax liability is based 
on the narrower tax unit. Thus, for example, where a working adult is 
living with his/her parents and their other dependent children, the 
household as a whole may have a relatively low equivalent income. 
That adult will, however, be assessed for tax purely on his/her own 
income without dependants, and may be liable for a significant tax 
payment. It is therefore, important to also analyse the position vis-a-
vis relative poverty lines when the narrower family is used as the 
recipient unit. 
We know that using the tax unit rather than the household does not 
make a great deal of difference to the overall numbers falling below 
relative lines (see Callan, et al., 1989). It is worth pursuing in the 
specific context of the income tax system, though, since this system is 
based, in general terms, on the narrower unit. For this reason, we are 
currently developing a model of the tax and benefit systems which 
will allow a full analysis of the effects of possible reforms on the basis 
of the family /tax unit. In assessing welfare implications, though, the 
extent of income sharing between tax units in the same household 
still has to be taken into account. In a re-survey of some of the 
participants in our 1987 survey, which has recently been completed, 
we have also gathered some information which should allow this 
income-sharing issue to be addressed. 
3.2 The PRSI System 
We now deal with the structure of the PRSI system, and its impact on 
contributions by those on low incomes. Focusing on employees, the 
first point to be emphasised is that PRSI has no general income 
exemption limit, nor has it a system of allowances corresponding to 
tax allowances. Contributions are levied on gross pay, and while 
there is a ceiling above which there is no further charge, there is no 
floor level. Certain limited classes of workers are completely exempt 
from contributions, but even part-time workers (working under 18 
hours a week) are, in general, liable for (reduced) contributions'. 
Secondly, PRSI contributions are based purely on the individual's 
earnings, they take no account of family circumstances. Thus PRSI 
contributions at the standard rate of 5.5% will be levied on a full-time 
employee, even if he/she has a large family which is well below the 
relative poverty thresholds. The only relevance which the family's 
situation will have is that the additional Health Contribution and Youth 
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Employment levies of 1.25% and 1 %, respectively, collected with 
PRSI contributions, are levied on the employer rather than the 
employee if the latter has a Medical Card. This will. of course. depend 
on the family's composition and income relative to the Medical Card 
thresholds. 
So, for an employee, it is easy to see how low family income together 
with the payment of substantial PRSI contributions can occur. In the 
case of the self-employed, including farmers, at the time our survey 
was carried out they were liable only for the Health and Youth 
Employment levies and not for PRSI itself. Thus, the amounts involved 
would be substantially less than for employees. From 1988/89, a 
PRSI contribution of 3% for this group was introduced as they are 
being brought within the coverage of the PRSI system. Currently their 
contribution rate stands at 4%, rising to 5% in 1990/91, and subject to 
a mi mi mum contribution of £208 per annum. However there is an 
exemption limit (currently "reckonable income" of £2,500 per annum) 
below which the self-employed are not liable to this contribution. 
Thus the structure of the system and its treatment oi those on low 
incomes is now of considerable relevance to the self-employed and 
farmers as well as employees. 
4 Impact of Reforming Income Tax/PRSI on the Poor 
4.1 Policy Objectives and Instruments 
Before examining possible policy changes, it is useful to clarify the 
objectives which such changes are designed to achieve and the 
problems faced in achieving them. In broad terms, anti-poverty policy 
can be seen as aiming to ensure that no-one falls below a given 
poverty line income. The income tax system is one instrument which 
can be used for this purpose. The social welfare system for the most 
part provides income support for those not in work. while the income 
tax system can play a role in ensuring a minimum income for those in 
work. However, schemes such as the Family Income Supplement 
(FIS) and child benefit also contribute to this latter objective. 
Anti-poverty policy cannot be thought of in isolation: the costs and 
incentive effects of different strategies must be borne in mind. The 
trade-offs involved are illustrated in Figure 1 below. which provides a 
stylized view of the relationship between gross and net income under 
three alternative income support strategies. labelled means-testing. 
basic income and modified basic income. For simplicity, the alter-
native systems are illustrated in terms of the same minimum income. 
The schedules above the "break-even point" (at which taxes paid are 
equal to benefits received) may reflect a single tax rate or a 
progressive marginal rate schedule; the essential differences between 
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~ FIGURE I Basic Income 




Modified Basic Income 
Means· Testing 
IL..------------------- Gross Income 
the three systems are in their treatment of incomes below the break-
even point. Again, for simplicity, the systems are illustrated with the 
same rate of tax above the break-even point. 
The line labelled "means-testing" reflects a strategy which brings 
each tax unit below the minimum income level up to precisely that 
level by providing income support sufficient to bridge the gap 
between pre-transfer income and the minimum income level. This 
implies that any increase in earned income will result in a pound for 
pound withdrawal of social welfare income. Thus, there is an effective 
100% benefit withdrawal rate facing those with gross incomes below 
this level. The line labelled "basic income" reflects an alternative 
strategy: it provides a minimum income to all, and has a uniform tax 
rate thereafter, which continues after the break-even point. The line 
labelled "modified basic income" is an intermediate position: it has a 
higher marginal tax rate on incomes below the break-even point. 
The basic income scheme is the most expensive method of providing 
any given minimum income target: it would in practice require a 
higher standard rate of tax than either of the alternative schemes to 
finance it. The means-testing option is the least expensive method, 
but at the cost of imposing an effective 100% marginal tax rate on 
those with incomes below the chosen level. A modified basic income 
scheme represents a compromise between these polar cases. 
Honohan (1987) costed a modified basic income scheme which 
involved a basic payment of £35 per person (with higher payments to 
the elderly), a standard tax rate of between 38 and 43 per cent, and an 
effective tax rate below the break-even point of 65 to 70 per cent. 
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While these costings deliberately excluded any extension of the 
direct tax base, Honohan concluded that "It is not possible to finance 
a basic income scheme which gives a payment of £55 to each adult". 
A similar view was taken by the Commission on Social Welfare (1986). 
The present system cannot be adequately represented by a single 
simple diagram. The interactions between the income tax and social 
welfare codes can be quite complex, and the shape of the implied 
schedule relating gross to net income can vary depending on several 
contingencies. But in broad terms, as compared with (modified) basic 
income schemes of similar aggregate costs, it opts for a higher 
minimum income coupled with high implicit marginal tax/bene(it 
withdrawal rates at low incomes. Even if this broad strategy is to be 
TABLES 
Interaction between income tax and FIS, married couple (1 PAYE earner) 
with 4 children 1987, 
£ per week 
Gross Income PRSI FIS Child Net 
income tax benefit income 
100 o 5.50 35.00 13.84 143.34 
125 10.31 6.88 22.50 13.84 144.16 
150 19.06 11.63 10.00 13.84 143.16 
175 36.01 13.56 o 13.84 147.48 
200 51.01 15.50 o 13.84 161.79 
maintained, it is useful to derive the relationships between gross and 
net income faced by particular families in order to identify problem 
areas and possible reforms. In this respect, there may be much to be 
learned from the integrated view of the income tax and social welfare 
systems taken by basic income schemes. 
4.2 Interactions between Income Tax and Family Income 
Supplement 
The survey evidence suggested that a very substantial proportion of 
poor households paying tax were headed by employees and con-
tained children. Low income employees with children may, of course, 
be entitled to income support under the Family Income Supplement 
scheme (FIS). FIS is paid to families under a gross income limit related 
to the number of children. The payment is a fixed proportion of the 
difference between gross pay and the gross income limit, subject to a 
maximum payment. 
Some of the employees below the poverty line who were found to be 
paying income tax were also entitled to Family Income Supplement 
(FIS), although very few were actually in receipt of the payment. In 
some cases, the entitlement to FIS could exceed the amount paid in 
tax, as Table 5 illustrates. The avoidance of such circular transfers is 
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not an end in itself (it would not, for instance, be considered desirable 
to avoid circular transfers if this involved an increase rather than a 
reduction in administrative costs). However, the low rate of take-up of 
FIS entitlements could be seen as arguing for its integration into the 
tax system, in order to make payment automatic. 
The interaction of the income tax system and the FIS scheme as 
constituted at present illustrates some of the problems raised by the 
lack of integration between the tax and social welfare codes. The fact 
that FIS pays a fixed proportion of the gap between gross income and 
a gross income limit implies that as income rises, FIS benefit is 
withdrawn at this proportion. In 1987, when the survey was under-
taken, the benefit withdrawal rate of 50 per cent, combined with a 
standard rate of tax of 35 per cent and a PRSI rate of 5.5 or 7. 75 per 
cent led to an effective tax rate of up to 92. 75 per cent. For employees 
just above the income tax exemption limits, the marginal relief rate of 
tax of 60 percent pushed the maximum effective tax rate of 117.75 per 
cent. Thus, Table 5 shows that as gross income rose from £100 to 
£175 per week, disposable income rose by less than £7. 
The main changes in the 1988 and 1989 Budgets affecting families 
with an income from employment were: 
1. A reduction in the standard rate of tax from 35 per cent to 32 per 
cent. 
2. An increase in the personal allowance from £2000 to £2050 
(doubled for married couples). 
3. An increase in the exemption limit from £2.650 to £3.000 for a 
single person, and double these levels for a married couple. 
4. The introduction of an addition to the exemption limit of £200 for 
each child, as mentioned earlier. 
5. Increases in the gross income limits below which FIS is payable, 
the maximum amounts payable, and an increase in the proportion 
of the shortfall between actual income and the gross income 
limit for which FIS is payable; this proportion is also the marginal 
benefit withdrawal rate. 
The net effects on the relationship between gross and net income, 
and effective marginal tax rates are illustrated in Table 6 below. The 
income regions over which high effective marginal tax rates apply 
have been moved around, and may now apply to more families than 
before. (Table 1 in the Appendix identifies the exact regions for which 
the marginal relief limit is below the FIS limit, in which the highest 
effective tax rates apply.) The increase in effective marginal tax rates 
shown in the table is partly due to the 1 O percentage point increase in 
the FIS benefit withdrawal rates. 
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This table illustrates why the reform of the tax sys.tem cannot be seen 
in isolation. Its interaction with the social we)fare code, and in 
particular the combined effect on net income and incentives must be 
considered. 
4.3 Polley options 
In the light of the foregoing analysis, what reforms of the direct 
tax/PRSI system would help to improve the poverty reduction 
TABLE 6 
Relationships between gross and net income for selected family types, 1987 and 
1989 (one PAYE earner) 
family gross disposable effective disposable effective 
type: income income marginal income marginal 
married (£/wk) in 1987 tax rate in 1989 tax rate 
couple (£/wk) in 1987 (£/wk) in 1989 
(no. of (%) (%) 
children) 
2 100 114.42 123.02 
125 115.24 97 130.24 71 
150 126.24 56 129.10 105 
175 140.55 43 144.16 40 
200 154.87 43 159.23 40 
4 100 143.34 150.34 
125 144.16 97 167.37 32 
150 143.16 104 160.81 126 
175 147.48 83 156.49 117 
200 161.79 43 166.15 61 
6 100 160.81 174.35 
125 163.62 89 196.97 10 
150 166.00 90 199.19 91 
175 168.38 90 192.82 125 
200 175.75 71 192.45 101 
performance of the system, and/or reduce the undesired side 
effects? A number of options can be considered. 
The previous section has highlighted the need for an integrated 
treatment of the FIS scheme and the tax code. Effective tax rates in 
excess of 100 per cent are not desirable on any grounds, and it is 
likely that effective tax rates approaching 100 per cent are simply 
unintended byproducts of the lack of integration. The low take-up of FIS 
can also be seen as arguing for an automatic payment which would 
operate through the tax system. 
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As regards the direct tax and PRSI system itself, the options for 
reducing the direct tax/PRSI liabilities of those on low equivalent 
incomes include child tax allowances, increasing. child additions to 
the exemption limits introduced in 1989, and reform of the PRSI 
system to provide some relief to those on low pay. 
If the objective is to aid families on low incomes, tax free allowances 
for children have little to recommend them. They are an expensive 
and inefficient method of providing such assistance. The benefit is 
not confined to those at low incomes; indeed, the value of the tax-free 
allowan.ce is greater for higher rate tax-payers. Whatever about 
arguments based on horizontal equity between those with/without 
children at a particular income level, child tax allowances are not an 
efficient way of targetting help towards low income families with 
children. 
Such considerations may well have prompted the recent introduction 
of child additions to the income tax exemption limits. This does 
indeed confine the benefit to low income families. The problem with 
this approach is the general one associated with exemption limits. A 
strict exemption limit involves a "kink" in the relationship between 
gross and net income, which implies an effective marginal tax rate of· 
over 100 per cent. In order to avoid this, it is necessary to give some of 
the benefit to those on higher incomes than the exemption limit. If this 
is not to prove expensive, it must not extend very far above the 
exemption limit. But this implies a high effective tax rate over the 
region between the exemption limit and the limit of marginal relief. 
PRSI liabilities were found to be quite important for those on low pay, 
relative to income tax liabilities. This reflects the fact that PRSI is 
payable on income from the first pound up. There is, however, an 
allowance against income tax for those on the higher rate of PRSI. 
From the point of view of poverty reduction (which was not its main 
objective), this tax-free allowance is ill-targetted: the effective benefit 
is greater for higher rate tax-payers. An alternative would be to 
abolish this tax-free allowance, and institute an allowance against 
PRSI rather than against income tax. This would result in a system 
similar to the recently rationalised UK structure (see Di I not and Webb, 
1989 for details). A revenue-neutral reform of this nature might allow a 
PRSI allowance of around £1500. This would favour those who are on 
low incomes and pay PRSI but are below the income tax exemption 
limits, and have a small benefit for those on the standard rate of tax, at 
the expense of higher rate tax-payers. Marginal tax rates would be 
reduced at v.ery low incomes but unaffected elsewhere. 
A summary of the gains to those at different income levels from the 
introuction of child additions to the exemption limits, increases in the 
child additions, and conversion of the PRSI allowance against tax to a 
genuine PRSI allowance is given in Table 7 below. 
It is important to note that the right-hand column is giving the gains to 
low income groups from a revenue neutral reform; the child additions 
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to exemption limits involve net additional costs. The effects of 
introduction of child additions to the exemption limits were quite large 
but concentrated, and further increases would concentrate gains on 
those at the higher end of the low-pay range. The revenue-neutral 
reform to the PRSI system would, on the other hand, provide a more 
widely spread benefit, tilted towards those on the lowest pay. 
5 How Much Could Tax Reform Achieve in Alleviating Poverty? 
Having discussed some reforms in the income tax and PRSI systems, 
it is worth looking finally at how great a contribution such reforms 
could actually make to directly alleviating poverty, that is, what the 
maximum possible effect could be. If we assume for the purpose of 
the exercise that a system could be designed under which no-one 
below the relative income thresholds pays income tax or PRSI 
contributions, we can measure first of all the impact this would have 
on the numbers in poverty. The results are illustrated in Table 8. 
TABLE 7 
Distribution of gains from policy changes for selected family types 
(married couple, one PAYE earner) 
family gross gain from disposable gain from gain from 
type income introduction income trebling converting 
(no. of i£1wk) of child in 1989 of chitd PRSI tax-
children) addition i£1wk) add!Uon tree allce 
to exemption to exemption to artce 
limit limit against 
1£200) (£600) PRSI 
2 100 0.00 123.02 0.00 1.58 
125 4.60 130.24 1.40 1.58 
150 0.00 129.10 8.99 2.02 
175 0.00 144.16 1.99 0.48 
200 0.00 159.23 0.00 0.47 
4 100 0.00 150.34 0.00 1.58 
125 6.01 167.37 0.00 1.58 
150 4.39 160.81 11.81 2.23 
175 0.00 156.49 15.78 0.47 
200 0.00 166.15 8.78 0.47 
6 100 0.00 174.35 0.00 1.58 
125 6.01 196.97 0.00 1.58 
150 8.98 199.19 7.21 1.58 
175 1.99 192.82 22.21 1.58 
200 0.00 192.45 22.59 .Q.17• 
• This loss arises because of the tact that medical card holders do not pay the health contribution or 
youth employment levy; the value of the new PRSI allowance set against a 5.5per cent ra1e would be less 
than the value of the old PASI tax allowance at the standard rate of 32 per cent. 
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TABLE 8 
Impact of Ellmlnatlng Income Tax/PRSI Contributions for those 
Below Relative Poverty Lines on the Numbers Below These Lines 
Relative Poverty Line 
40% 50% 60% 
% of households 
below line 7.5 17.4 29.9 
% of those paying 
income tax/PRSI 10.9 12.4 18. 1 
% of those below and 
paying income 
tax/PRSI below 
because of these 
deductions 66.0 56.0 56.0 
So % below line in 
the absence of 
income tax/PRSI 7.0 16.2 26.9 
As described in Section 2, the analysis of our survey showed the 
percentage of those below the thresholds who paid some tax and I or 
PRSI varying from 11 % with the 40% threshold to 18% with the 60% 
line, but not all of these would be above the threshold even if they paid 
no tax/PRSI. In fact, we saw that two thirds of the "taxpayers" under 
the 40% line, and 56% of those under the two higher lines, would have 
been above the relevant threshold if income tax/PRSI had not been 
deducted from gross income. If these households had not been 
brought below the thresholds by tax/PRSI, the overall percentage 
falling below the 40% line would have been 7% rather than 7.5%. For 
the 50% threshold the reduction would be from 17.4% to 16.2%, while 
a more substantial fall, from 29.9% to 26.9% would be seen at the 
highest threshold. 
This emphasis purely on the numbers falling below the thresholds 
does. not convey the full picture though. Clearly, those taxpayers who 
are below the lines, and would still be below even if they were not 
paying tax, would none the less be better ott if they were not doing so. 
This is missed by looking only at the numbers below even a range of 
thresholds. This in fact illustrates a more general point about the 
shortcomings of simply focusing on the number of households/ 
persons below a poverty line as an overall measure of poverty, in that 
it takes no account of the intensity of poverty of ditterent households, 
the extent to which they fall below the poverty line. (This criticism of 
the "headcount" as a poverty measure has been made most 
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trenchantly by Sen (1976), a.nd a variety of altern{ltive measu·res has 
been proposed: for a discussion and application to Irish data see 
Nolan and Callan (1989) and Callan et al (1989)) .. 
A useful approach is therefore to consider the impact of reforms not 
just on the numbers in poverty, but also on the aggregate poverty gap. 
We saw in Section 2 that a household's poverty gap is the distance (in 
money terms) it falls below the poverty line: the aggregate poverty gap 
is simply the sum of the individual gaps for all households below the 
line. (See for example the use of this aggregate in assessing the 
impact on social welfare payments in Callan and Nolan (1989)). 
Suppose then that a reform of the income tax and PRSI systems could 
bring about a situation where 
(i) taxpaying households below the poverty line even by pre-tax 
income now pay no tax, so their poverty gaps are reduced by the full 
amount of the tax they paid: and. 
(ii) households above the poverty line by pre-tax income but brought 
below it by tax now pay only enough tax to leave them at, rather than 
below, the line, so their poverty gaps are eliminated. 
This would have the following impact on the aggregate poverty gap at 
each line: 
at the 40% line it would fall by about 4% 
at the 50% line it would fall by about 6% 
at the 600/o line it would fall by about 8-9% 
These reductions are in fact slightly smaller than the percentage falls 
in the so-called "headcount" measure, the numbers below the thres-
holds, implied by the figures presented in Table 5. (These would be 
falls of 6.5%, 7% and 10% for the 40%, 50% and 60% relative lines, 
respectively.) It is interesting to explore why this is the case. Focusing 
purely on the numbers below the threshold, each household brought 
above the line by the tax reform is given equal weight, irrespective of 
how far below they had fallen and how this compared with the 
situation of those below and not paying tax. Those who benefit by the 
elimination of their tax but remain below the threshold, on the other 
hand, are not counted at all. So the finding that the elimination of tax 
reduces the aggregate poverty gap by less (in percentage terms) that 
the numbers below the threshold arises because: 
(i) the poverty gaps for "poor taxpayers" lifted above the threshold by 
the hypothetical tax reform are less, on average, than those of the 
non-taxpayers below the threshold: (depending on the threshold, the 
former have average gaps of about 75-800/o of the latter); thus merely 
counting the numbers lifted above the threshold by the reform in 
some sense weights these cases too heavily. 
(ii) The inclusion in the aggregate poverty gap calculation of the 
reduction in the gaps of those taxpayers who remain below after the 
tax reform works in the other direction: their gaps are reduced by 
25-350/o on average, depending on the threshold, but this is not 
sufficient to offset (i). 
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Clearly, all these calculations are purely static, in,the sense that they 
take no account of any behavioural responses the hypothetical tax 
reform might produce. It also assumes that the tax.and PRSI systems 
could be altered in such a way as to bring about this result. 
6 Conclusion 
The evidence from the ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty 
and Usage of State Services suggests that about one household in 
eight of those below the 40 and 50 per cent relative poverty lines is 
paying income tax and/or PRSI. This figure rises to something just 
under one in five at the higher 60 percent relative poverty tine. For this 
minority, though, the amount paid in income tax and PRSI was 
significant. 
Households headed by an employee, although only a small pro-
portion of the households below the poverty lines, account for about 
600/o of such households paying tax/PRSl. Most of the low-income 
households paying tax contain children, often three or more. 
Considering broad policy strategies, the trade-off between the cost of 
guaranteeing a minimum income and the effective tax rates at low 
incomes was emphasised. The very high implicit tax rates caused by 
the combined operation of marginal relief above the income tax 
exemption limits, and the FIS benefit withdrawal rate were noted. 
Taken together with the low rate of take-up of entitlement to FIS, this 
argued for a more integrated scheme. 
Methods of reducing the income tax and PRSI paid by those below 
the poverty line were also discussed, including the recently-intro-
duced child additions to the tax exemption limits, and conversion of 
the PRSI allowance against income tax to an allowance against PRSI 
itself. The survey evidence showed that even a perfectly targeted 
reduction in income tax and PRSI liabilities would have only a limited 
effect on the numbers in poverty and the aggregate poverty gap. 
Nonetheless, some clear anomalies were identified, and addressing 
these could be of major significance for certain households. In 
addition to this static picture, the dynamic effects of tax reforms must 
also be taken into account. Reducing tax and PRSI for low income 
earners. and eliminating the features emphasised here which give 
rise to stark disincentive effects, could themselves help to stimulate 
employment. Thus both the direct and indirect effects of ironing out 
the anomalies in the existing taxation and income maintenance 
systems would contribute to the alleviation of poverty. 
Footnotes 
1. Women in receipt of widow's pension or deserted wife's benefit/· 
allowances or unmarried mother's allowance are exempt. Part-time 
workers are, in general, liable for reduced contributions of only 2%, 
but those who also hold a Medical Card are also exempt from these. 
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Interaction between exemption llmlla and FIS: 1987 and 1989 
1987 
no o! no of 50% exemption marginal FIS 
adults children relative limit• relief limit• 
poverty limit• 
line• 
1 0 42 75 50.79 n.a. OOO 
' 
0 70.79 101.57 110.00 0.00 
' 
1 8507 101.57 , 10.00 104.00 
' ' 
99.18 101.57 110.00 126.00 
' 
3 113.29 101.57 110.00 148.00 
' 
4 127.40 101.57 110.00 170.00 
' 
5 141.50 101.57 101.57 192.00 
' 
6 155.61 101.57 110.00 192.00 
1989 
no. of no. of 50% exemption marginal FIS 




1 0 46.65 57.49 57.49 0.00 
' 
0 77.44 114.99 122.17 0.00 
' 
1 92.84 118.82 130.38 112.00 
' ' 
108.24 122.65 138.59 136.00 
2 3 123 63 126.49 146.81 160.00 
2 4 139.03 130.32 155.02 184.00 
2 5 154.42 134.15 163.23 208.00 
2 6 169.82 137.98 171.45 218.00 
•£ per week. 
